100 target teratas Amerika untuk serangan nuklir 2022

Dalam lima tahun ke depan, Rusia akan merampungkan modernisasi persenjataan nuklirnya. Fasilitas peluncuran Rudal (silo) Rusia nantinya akan mampu menahan serangan pertama, sambil melancarkan serangan balasan.

Rusia secara aktif melakukan modernisasi persenjataan nuklirnya agar pada 2024 tidak ada lagi rudal atau alat pengangkut era Soviet yang tersisa pada angkatan daratnya.

Hasilnya, Angkatan Bersenjata Rusia akan memperoleh paket lengkap rudal strategis antarbenua berbasis darat sebagai bagian dari pencegah nuklir negara itu.

Rudal nuklir yang dimiliki Rusia saat ini

Peluncuran Rudal Balistik Antarbenua "Topol-M" dari kosmodrom Pleseck.

TASS

Menurut situs web Strategic Nuclear Weapons of Russia, pada awal 2020, Rusia telah mengerahkan 532 kapal strategis yang mampu membawa hingga 2.100 hulu ledak nuklir (di bawah usulan perjanjian pengurangan senjata strategis START III dengan AS).

Inilah beberapa rudal nuklir yang dimiliki Angkatan Bersenjata Rusia saat ini:

• 46 rudal berat R-36M2 (SS-18)
• 2 sistem Avangard (rudal UR-100NUTTKh, SS-19 Mod 4)
• 45 sistem Topol bergerak (SS-25)
• 60 sistem Topol-M peluncuran silo (SS-27)
• 18 sistem Topol-M bergerak (SS-27)
• 135 sistem rudal RS-24 Yarsbergerak dan 14 peluncuran silo

Dari rudal-rudal di atas, R-36M2 dan Topol akan dinonaktifkan dan digantikan oleh rudal Yars terbaru, yang akan ditempatkan di silo yang ditempati rudal yang lama, Selain itu, rudal tersebut juga akan dipasang pada peluncur bergerak dengan roda, serta roket Sarmat yang berat.

Yars

Peluncur otonom "Yars".

Kementerian Pertahanan Federasi Rusia/Global Look Press

“Fitur utama Rudal baru adalah jalur terbang yang tidak dapat diprediksi oleh sistem pertahanan udara musuh. Dalam perjalanannya ke target, pola terbang Yars tidak seperti parabola yang menjadi ciri khas rudal pada umumnya, melainkan menggeliat seperti ular. Hal ini  akan menyulitkan musuh dalam memprediksi target yang dituju," jelas Dmitry Safonov, mantan analis militer untuk surat kabar Izvestia, kepada Russia Beyond.

Menurut Safonov, mesin rudal sama sekali tidak seperti pendahulunya. Yars tidak hanya meninggalkan silo pada kecepatan yang lebih tinggi, tetapi dapat terus mengubah ketinggian, arah, dan kecepatan di lapisan bawah atmosfer untuk membingungkan sistem pertahanan musuh.

"Fitur penting Yars lainnya adalah adanya enam hulu ledak berpemandu presisi, yang dapat melepaskan diri dalam penerbangan dan mengirim muatan mereka ke ‘alamatnya’,'" tambah Safonov.

Setiap hulu ledak dapat menghasilkan ledakan hingga 100 kiloton. Sebagai perbandingan, bom nuklir yang dijatuhkan oleh Amerika di Hiroshima dan Nagasaki menghasilkan ledakan lima kali lebih lemah (masing-masing sekitar 20 kiloton).

Sarmat

Tes tembakan rudal balistik antarbenua yang beras "Sarmat".

Kementerian Pertahanan Federasi Rusia

Rudal berbobot sekitar 100 ton ini memiliki jangkauan setidaknya 17.000 kilometer.  Menurut para perancangnya, Sarmat dapat terbang ke sasaran bahkan melalui Kutub Selatan, tempat di mana tidak ada yang akan mengharapkannya, dan di mana tidak terdapat sistem pertahanan rudal.

"Senjata ini dapat bertahan dari serangan pertama oleh musuh, karena silo-nya dilindungi terhadap serangan rudal langsung. Terlebih lagi, sistem panduannya terlindung dari efek penonaktifan gelombang radio-magnetik,” terang Viktor Litovkin, Analis Militer Kantor Berita Rusia TASS kepada Russia Beyond.

Selain itu, Sarmat akan dilengkapi dengan tidak kurang dari 15 hulu ledak nuklir yang dipandu dengan presisi.

“Hulu ledak ini terletak di bagian dalam berdasarkan prinsip grapeshot (proyektil yang bukan merupakan elemen padat, tetapi susunan geometris peluru bundar yang dikemas dalam tas kanvas). Proyektil kemudian dilepas pada saat yang tepat, menjatuhkan sekelompok bom nuklir ke tanah dengan hasil ledakan hingga 300 kiloton,” tambah Litovkin.

BrahMos merupakan rudal jelajah tercepat di dunia hasil kolaborasi Rusia-India. Rudal ini secara khusus telah menjadi dasar untuk pengembangan lebih lanjut teknologi rudal jelajah Rusia untuk militer India. Baca selengkapnya di sini!

Ketika mengambil atau mengutip segala materi dari Russia Beyond, mohon masukkan tautan ke artikel asli.

Dapatkan cerita terbaik minggu ini langsung ke email Anda

National Response Scenario Number One is the United States federal government's planned response to a nuclear attack.[1] It is one of the National Response Scenarios developed by the United States Department of Homeland Security, considered the most likely of fifteen emergency scenarios to impact the United States. The Scenarios are related to the National Response Framework (NRF), which describes the structures and mechanisms of a response and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) that gives a framework to orchestrate emergency management.

The guidelines and the implementation framework were developed after the September 11 attacks and the Hurricane Katrina disaster.

The Nuclear Threat[edit]

Nuclear weapons materials on the black market are a global concern,[2][3] and there is concern about the possible detonation of a small, crude nuclear weapon by a terrorist group in a major city, with significant loss of life and property.[4][5]

President Barack Obama has reviewed Homeland Security policy and concluded that "attacks using improvised nuclear devices ... pose a serious and increasing national security risk."[6] In their presidential contest, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry both agreed that the most serious danger facing the United States is the possibility that terrorists could obtain a nuclear bomb.[7] Most nuclear-weapon analysts agree that "building such a device would pose few technological challenges to reasonably competent terrorists.” The main barrier is acquiring highly enriched uranium.[8]

Despite a number of claims,[9][10] there is no credible evidence that any terrorist group has yet succeeded in obtaining a nuclear bomb or the materials needed to make one.[7][11] In 2004, Graham Allison, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration, wrote that "on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not."[12] Also in 2004, Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information stated: "I wouldn't be at all surprised if nuclear weapons are used over the next 15 or 20 years, first and foremost by a terrorist group that gets its hands on a Russian nuclear weapon or a Pakistani nuclear weapon."[5] In 2006, Robert Gallucci of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service estimated that "it is more likely than not that al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates will detonate a nuclear weapon in a U.S. city within the next five to ten years."[12]

The Scenario[edit]

The response timeline will begin the instant the detonation occurs. In this scenario, a terrorist cell creates a nuclear device using highly enriched uranium (HEU) using nuclear device components that are smuggled into the United States. The 10-kiloton nuclear device would most likely be assembled near a large U.S. city. The cities that would most likely be attacked are Washington, New York City and Los Angeles. Using a van or SUV, the device could easily be delivered to the heart of a city and detonated. The effects and response planning from a nuclear blast are determined using statics from Washington, the most likely target. An estimated 5,000 casualties would be killed within .25 of a second after detonation and within 15 seconds an estimated 30,000 casualties would result from the detonation. Estimates could climb to as much as 100,000 after 24 hours. Buildings within three miles are severely damaged. The contaminated area would be roughly 3,000 square miles depending on environmental factors such as weather and terrain. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) damages much of electronic devices, power grids and communication systems in the surrounding area.[1]

US scientists with a full-scale cut-away model of the W48 155-mm nuclear artillery shell, a very small tactical nuclear weapon with an explosive yield equivalent to 72 tons of TNT (0.072 kiloton). It could be fired from any standard 155 mm (6.1 inch) howitzer e.g. the M114 or M198

H-912 transport container for Mk-54 SADM.

An American 8 inch W33 nuclear artillery shell. This warhead had a number of different yield options e.g. 5 kilotons. It could be fired from any standard 203mm (8 inch) howitzer e.g. the M110 or M115

Effects[edit][edit]

The detonation will cause many secondary hazards. The intense heat of a nuclear explosion would produce fires throughout the immediate blast zone. Damaged buildings, downed power and phone lines, broken gas lines and water mains, and weakened bridges and tunnels are hazardous conditions that will need to be assessed depending on the type of industries present. For example, chemical or petroleum production, industrial storage facilities, and manufacturing operations could cause significant releases of hazardous materials. Environmental considerations such as nearby bodies of water, prevailing winds and the general type of terrain have to be considered for an emergency response and evacuation. An explosion in a large city would result in an estimated 450,000 to 700,000 displaced persons flooding into nearby states. The country’s economic impact would be hundreds of billions of dollars with the estimated time of recovery being decades. Furthermore, the electronic magnetic pulse (EMP), a high-voltage spike that radiates out from the detonation site, can disrupt the communication networks and electronic equipment within a 3-mile range from a 10-kiloton ground blast. The electrical power grid is likely to be damaged by the destruction of substations, power production facilities and distribution installations. The grid damage may cause power outages over wide areas and over several states. These outages should be repaired within several days to a couple of weeks. Communication systems would suffer similar damage and will likely be repaired within similar time frames. There will likely be significant damage to general public support infrastructures. These systems include transportation such as air, water, rail, highway, power generation and distribution facilities and food and fuel distribution points. There will be safety concerns about the reliability of many structures like dams, levees, nuclear power plants, hazardous material storage facilities and still standing tall buildings all of which could become additional hazards. Structures may be damaged that are used to provide essential services such as hospitals, schools, police and fire departments.[1]

Non-radioactive injuries from the blast itself would result from the human body being thrown and from impacts from objects. The detonation would produce intense heat that will cause burns to exposed skin and eyes. There are two general categories of nuclear radiation produced in a detonation. First, is the prompt nuclear radiation that is created from the initial explosion. This radiation may expose unprotected people to large gamma ray or neutron doses. Radioactive fallout in the form of a large dust cloud would begin within two hours after the explosion and would dissipate within minutes to weeks. The radiation from the fallout could contaminate an area for many years. The largest radiation concerns following an incident will be the radioactive material deposited on the ground, as people are evacuated from the fallout areas. These effects are likely to have significantly larger impacts on the population than internal doses. Internal doses tend to expose the body to relatively small radiation doses over a long period of time, which produces different effects than large radiation doses received during a short period of time. As the distance from ground zero increases to twelve miles, injuries due to radiation exposure will decrease, and lower level contamination, evacuation, and sheltering issues will become the major concern and distances greater than 150 miles from ground zero of a nuclear detonation, acute health concerns will not become a significant issue.[1]

Long-term consequences[edit]

Years or even decades after an explosion, there will still be health concerns such as cancers in the exposed population. The number of these cancers will likely run into the thousands and cause a large social and financial cost. Historically, decontamination of sites involves the removal of all affected material, so most buildings in the immediate downwind fallout path will likely have to be destroyed in the decontamination effort. As the distance from the detonation site increases, the contamination level will decrease but buildings that have not been destroyed will require decontamination and will take years at a high financial cost at times becoming more expensive than the building itself. Roughly 3,000 square miles of land will have to undergo decontamination requiring decades and billions of dollars to complete. Service disruption will not be restored for years because the affected area will not be returned to use until the decontamination is complete and structures rebuilt. The city water supply is unlikely to become substantially contaminated with radiation by way of water main breaks, but is likely to suffer from small amounts of radiation and large amounts of debris. Replacement of lost private property and goods could add billions to the cost.

A national recession will most likely result from the attack. The volume of contaminated material that will be removed will overwhelm national hazardous waste disposal facilities and will severely challenge the nation’s ability to transport material. This effort will be the most expensive and time-consuming part of recovery and will likely cost many billions of dollars and take many years.[1]

Call for help[edit]

In response a governor can request Federal assistance, including assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), when local and State capabilities have been determined insufficient to handle the emergency and is triggered by a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency. Under this directive assistance such as funding, resources, and critical services, will be provided but will always respect the sovereignty of local, tribal, and State governments while giving assistance. Furthermore, under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 four criteria exist for an immediate call for help from the local level to the federal government.[13]

1. A Federal department or agency acting on its own authority has requested DHS assistance.
2. The resources of State and local authorities have become overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested.
3. Multiple federal departments have become substantially involved in an incident.
4. The DHS has been ordered by the President to manage the emergency response.

Chain of command[edit]

Initially, the local first responders such as the fire department would become the incident commander. As the situation escalates and more and more agencies become involved the President would have overall authority. The DHS would act in an advisory role with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinating emergency response efforts. The DOD while retaining overall authority of military forces would support the FEMA mission. The DOD would appoint a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to become the central contact for the DOD and to interact with other agencies. The DHS would appoint a Federal Security Officer (FSO) to become a central official for coordination of federal resources and the central communication focus for all departments and agencies.[1]

Dalam hal semua departemen dan lembaga federal yang diminta untuk bantuan akan mengidentifikasi dan memobilisasi staf dan ahli subjek untuk memenuhi tanggung jawab departemen mereka. Staf akan dikirim ke Kantor Lapangan Gabungan (JFO), termasuk pejabat federal yang mewakili departemen dan lembaga dengan otoritas tertentu, personel utama untuk bagian JFO (operasi, perencanaan, logistik, dan administrasi dan keuangan). Mereka akan mulai mengaktifkan tim federal dan sumber daya lainnya seperti yang diminta oleh DHS atau sesuai dengan otoritas departemen atau agen. [14] Seorang Pejabat Koordinasi Federal (FCO) akan dinamai oleh Presiden untuk memfasilitasi semua operasi menjadi Komando Pusat dan Pejabat Kontrol. [15]

Gubernur negara bagian akan memiliki wewenang atas semua sumber daya negara termasuk Garda Nasional. Gubernur juga akan berinteraksi dengan gubernur lain untuk membawa sumber daya dari negara bagian lain. Gubernur memiliki pejabat koordinasi negara (SCO) yang bertugas mengalokasikan semua upaya respons negara dalam kemitraan dengan FEMA. [15]

Continuity of Government (COG) [sunting][edit]

Jika alat nuklir menghancurkan jantung Washington, D.C., sebagian besar kepemimpinan AS akan dihancurkan bersamanya. Rencana COG yang sangat rahasia dan diklasifikasikan atau kesinambungan pemerintah adalah protokol yang ada untuk menangani kemungkinan seperti itu. Setelah peledakan nuklir di dekat pusat Washington, D.C., presiden, mungkin wakil presiden dan sebagian besar anggota Kongres akan dianggap mati. Cog merinci garis suksesi dan menjadi semacam pemerintahan bayangan. Ini mencegah AS menjadi sepenuhnya tanpa pemimpin. Hal ini juga memungkinkan AS untuk berurusan dengan bencana, membela diri dan mulai berperang yang akan ditemukan. Ini akan menjadi pejabat karier dan bukan orang yang ditunjuk secara politis. Kontinjensi ini hanya akan ada sampai kepresidenan dan Kongres dapat dilarutkan yang bisa memakan waktu bertahun -tahun. [16]

Pencarian dan Penyelamatan [sunting][edit]

Kebakaran lokal, polisi, dan rumah sakit akan kewalahan atau rusak sampai non-fungsionalitas. Pencarian dan penyelamatan langsung dari sebuah kota yang dilanda ledakan nuklir akan menjadi warga sipil, penegak hukum atau kepemimpinan militer. Dalam kasus serangan terhadap Washington, presiden atau penerus presiden bersama dengan potensi anggota Kongres, kepemimpinan militer, kepala departemen dan agensi, dan hakim agung Mahkamah Agung akan menjadi target penyelamatan bernilai tinggi. Penyelamatan awal akan berasal dari helikopter Angkatan Darat AS yang ditempatkan di sekitar Capitol. [17] Personel penyelamat tambahan akan mulai membanjiri daerah yang terkena dampak dari sumber -sumber militer AS, sukarelawan FEMA dan sipil. Upaya penyelamatan akan diarahkan ke zona kemampuan bertahan hidup. Penjaga Pantai akan melakukan operasi penyelamatan sungai dan di luar pantai di bawah arahan FEMA. Sumber daya dari negara bagian sekitarnya termasuk kebakaran, polisi, EMT dan Pengawal Nasional akan mulai tiba dalam waktu 24 jam. Tingkat radiasi yang diharapkan akan membatasi total waktu yang dapat dihabiskan pekerja di daerah yang terkena dampak, dengan cepat menyebabkan kekurangan pekerja yang bersedia, berkualitas, dan terlatih. Departemen Tenaga Kerja Amerika Serikat akan memantau waktu penyelamatan dan tenaga medis yang bekerja di dalam daerah yang terkena dampak untuk memastikan mereka tidak terlalu terpapar dengan kondisi kerja yang berbahaya. [1] Badan Perlindungan Lingkungan (EPA) akan mengelola data teknis, merekomendasikan langkah -langkah perlindungan serta untuk membantu mengembangkan rencana pembersihan lingkungan jangka panjang. [18]

Respon Medis [sunting][edit]

Ribuan akan membutuhkan dekontaminasi dan perawatan. Karena jumlah korban yang tinggi, tingkat perawatan mungkin secara signifikan lebih rendah dari biasanya. Ketika kewalahan dengan para korban yang membutuhkan perawatan, keputusan harus dibuat berdasarkan fakta bahwa semakin cepat timbulnya gejala, semakin tinggi dosis yang diterima dan semakin kecil kemungkinan korban untuk bertahan hidup bahkan dengan intervensi medis. Metode triase ini memastikan bahwa sumber daya paling baik digunakan dengan cara yang akan membuat dampak maksimal.

Untuk peledakan nuklir, kegiatan penyelamatan jiwa yang paling efektif adalah yang membahas evakuasi atau tempat perlindungan di tempat korban potensial di jalur kejatuhan langsung, komunikasi yang efektif dari instruksi dengan populasi yang terkena dampak, dan dekontaminasi yang efisien dari populasi yang dievakuasi . Departemen Kesehatan dan Layanan Kemanusiaan akan mengeluarkan peringatan seperti itu dan membantu menentukan potensi bahaya menggunakan tidak hanya speaker yang keras, tetapi juga pesan Twitter, Facebook, telepon, dan televisi. Di bawah DHHS ada 10.000 sukarelawan yang dikenal sebagai tim bantuan medis bencana DMAT yang terdiri dari dokter, EMT, perawat dan personel ruang gawat darurat yang akan difasalisasikan dan dikerahkan dalam 24 jam. [19]

The Center for Disease Control (CDC) would monitor the spread of possible infections and diseases arising after the explosion. In doing so, they would help to contain the spread of infectious disease in what would be massive casualties from victims with now weakened immune systems and working hand in hand with the DHHS would help to bring in stock piles of medical supplies located around the country. DHHS would also rely upon the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center to help determine how weather will affect the fallout from the radiation.

Three zones around the detonation area would be determined. Roughly one half mile from the explosion center would be considered the no-go zone or zone one. Here buildings are completely destroyed with the assumption of no survivability. Zone two, or the moderate damage zone, one half to one mile from the detonation site, has buildings in various states of damage with the possibility of survivors. There would be significant amounts of heat and radiation present as well as spreading flames. One to two miles from the blast epicenter is the light damage zone, or zone three, would have received damage from the blast pressure wave however the structures in this zone would be somewhat intact. Survivors here would still be exposed to radiation and have temporary or permanent blindness and injuries. In these zones would be created RTR sites a medical emergency response system for the collection of survivors directed by the DHHS. RTR 1 sites would be closest to the blast area treating the critically injured while RTR 2 sites would be stationed outside of the blast zone. RTR 3 would be designated collection points to transport the injured away from the area. Hospitals in the area would become medical centers and collection points. Assembly centers would be to gather those that are not critically injured for transport away from the area. However, this is a temporary solution because these points would become quickly overloaded and more permanent care facilities are designated in nearby cities and states.[20] Civilian air lines, commercial trucking, buses, trains and, in case of an attack near a coastal area, cruise lines all have set aside roughly ten percent of their fleets to help transport injured persons during an emergency.[1] Injured persons would be given color-coded tags called triage tags or DIME tags. Out of sight of the patient, the injured would be designated black for morgue expectant, red for urgent, yellow for delayed treatment and green for minimal injuries. Portable disaster morgues along with federalized morticians would be activated to collect the casualties .[21]

Military support[edit]

Only federal agencies can request Department of Defense (DOD) support of Title 10 forces. A federal agency can make the request on behalf of a state in need of assistance. The state in question must have or is expected to be incapable of responding to an emergency situation. In the case of a nuclear detonation FEMA would make the request. The DOD maintains command of the US Armed Forces but lends its support with guidance from FEMA. Title 10 forces are then activated under DSCA (Defense Support of Civil Authorities).[22] This would allow military forces to supplement emergency responders in the disaster area. Military actions would include dispatching response units; making incident scene reports; detecting and identifying the source; establishing a perimeter; collecting information; making hazard assessments and predictions; coordinating hospital and urgent care facilities; coordinating county and state response requests; and coordinating monitoring, surveying, and sampling operations.[1]

The resources the military could bring would be extensive using both Active Duty and Reserve military forces as well as National Guard units. Medical personnel and supplies would be brought in as well as specially trained search and rescue units trained to work in contaminated environments. Stock piles of food, water and medical supplies would also be brought to points just outside the perimeter of the disaster area for redistribution. Aircraft could be brought to transport large numbers of casualties or bring in supplies. The Army Chemical Corps would bring CBRN or Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear units to decontaminate survivors of an attack as well as personnel, vehicles and equipment entering and leaving the contamination area.[23] Additionally, the US Army could bring in CCMRF Units. CCMRF is a Title 10 task force with both Active and Reserve Components. CCMRF's primary role when responding to a CBRN event is to augment the consequence management efforts of the first responders. The CCMRF fielding plan establishes three separate CCMRFs to provide a response capability to multiple CBRNE events. CCMRFs are identical in force structure and are self-sustaining and tailorable to any CBRNE event. A CCMRF has unique CBRNE trained personnel and equipment as well as general purpose forces trained to operate in a CBRNE environment.[24] Survivors in such a disaster scenario could become desperate and hostile. The military would provide emergency personnel force protection such as armed escorts to ensure against possible attacks. Military forces would also be providing real time intelligence on changing ground conditions. Military forces would also quickly construct a communications network.[25] The US Army Corps of Engineers would be able to help construct temporary shelters for the injured and emergency responders as well as to determine the soundness of structures damaged in the attack such as bridges, dams or large buildings that have the potential to become a hazard. They would also be involved in the long term rebuilding of more permanent structures as well.[26] Naval forces would also serve as floating hospitals and treatment centers.[27] Additionally, hundreds of members of the US Marine Corps (USMC) CBIRF or Chemical Biological and Incident Response Force would become the shock troops for search and rescue operations redeploying from locations around the world to the site of impact .[28] The US Coast Guard (USCG) would also be helping with search and rescue and medical support but would be under the control of the DHS.[1]

Counter-response[edit][edit]

Kegiatan atribusi di lokasi peledakan akan mengandalkan teknik forensik ilmiah dan akan disediakan oleh tim nasional khusus. Tindakan personel situs insiden akan mencakup kontrol lokasi dan investigasi kriminal. Otoritas federal atau militer akan melakukan kegiatan pemahaman. [1]

Setelah pemogokan nuklir AS akan mengadopsi semacam mentalitas sandera. Asumsinya adalah bahwa akan ada lebih dari satu perangkat. Bangsa nakal atau kelompok teroris dapat mengajukan tuntutan dan jika AS tidak mematuhi mereka akan mulai meledakkan perangkat nuklir di kota -kota lain. Pemerintah AS tidak akan tahu dengan pasti apakah perangkat seperti itu ada atau di mana mereka berada. [1]

Untuk melawan skenario ini, presiden atau penerus yang masih hidup akan memesan kuncian semua perbatasan A.S. Departemen Keamanan Dalam Negeri akan menginstruksikan Departemen Transportasi (DOT), Penjaga Pantai, Otoritas Pelabuhan, dan Bea Cukai dan Perlindungan Perbatasan AS (CBP) untuk menutup semua perbatasan. Administrasi Penerbangan Federal akan mengeluarkan kontrol keamanan lalu lintas udara dan Air AIDS AIDS Rencana Darurat atau Scatana. Ini akan membumikan semua lalu lintas udara komersial di AS. Penerbangan di udara akan dialihkan ke pelabuhan udara terdekat. Satu -satunya perjalanan udara yang diizinkan adalah DoD atau penerbangan darurat. [29] Militer akan ditempatkan pada tingkat kesiapan tertinggi, kondisi pertahanan (DEFCON) 1, serta tingkat peringatan terorisme tertinggi, delta kondisi perlindungan kekuatan (FPCON).

Untuk membantu menentukan apakah dan di mana perangkat lain ada, tim pendukung darurat nuklir (NEST) akan digunakan. Terdiri dari ratusan ilmuwan nuklir, insinyur dan teknisi, ratusan tim ini, yang tersebar di seluruh AS, akan mulai mencari kota -kota besar yang dianggap paling mungkin menjadi target. Mereka akan mengenakan pakaian dataran yang mengendarai kendaraan atau helikopter yang tidak bertanda menggunakan peralatan yang sangat sensitif yang mampu mendeteksi radiasi. [Kutipan yang diperlukan] Penegakan hukum setempat serta Biro Investigasi Federal (FBI), Badan Intelijen Pusat (CIA), dan Badan Keamanan Nasional (NSA) dapat memulai penyelidikan terbesar yang pernah dilakukan. Yang pertama menentukan apakah dan di mana perangkat lain berada dan kedua untuk menentukan siapa dan di mana bertanggung jawab. Tim forensik nuklir akan dikerahkan ke lokasi peledakan untuk menentukan dari mana bahan nuklir berasal dari pembuatan senjata. [30]citation needed] Local law enforcement as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) would conceivably begin the largest investigation ever conducted. The first to determine if and where other devices are located and second to determine who and where is responsible. Nuclear Forensic Teams would be deployed to the detonation site to determine where the nuclear material came from used in the making of the weapon.[30]

Kemungkinan besar kelompok teroris atau negara nakal pada akhirnya akan melangkah maju untuk mengklaim tanggung jawab. Namun, negara yang melakukan hal itu akan menghadapi reaksi yang luar biasa dalam bentuk invasi atau bahkan respons penghitung nuklir dari AS atau sekutunya. Intinya, negara yang bertanggung jawab akan menjadi target duduk. Tersangka yang lebih mungkin menjadi kelompok teroris. Sel atau kelompok teroris akan jauh lebih sulit untuk dilacak dan dapat tersebar di banyak negara. Sebuah kritik adalah jika AS menyalahkan negara atau kelompok yang salah dan menyerang target yang salah jika tidak ada yang maju untuk mengklaim bertanggung jawab.

Documentaries[edit][edit]

Skenario ini dimainkan dalam film dokumenter History Channel, "The Day After Disaster."

Lihat juga aslinya][edit]

Buku teks kedokteran militer mengandung materi tentang perawatan yang terluka, terutama yang mengalami cedera terkait radiasi.

References[edit][edit]

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5. ^ Abnicholas D. Kristof. Nuklir 9/11 The New York Times, 10 Maret 2004.a b Nicholas D. Kristof. A Nuclear 9/11 The New York Times, March 10, 2004.
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8. ^Charles D. Ferguson. Mencegah nuklir 9/11 & nbsp;: pertama, mengamankan uranium yang sangat diperkaya The New York Times, 24 September 2004. Charles D. Ferguson. Preventing a nuclear 9/11 : First, secure the highly enriched uranium The New York Times, September 24, 2004.
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Kota -kota AS mana yang akan ditargetkan dalam perang nuklir?

Di mana tempat teraman untuk tinggal jika ada perang nuklir?

Apa tempat terbaik selama serangan nuklir?